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[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens
the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions,
too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often ex-
tending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal
law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent pro-
tective force of state law — for without it, the full realization of our
liberties cannot be guaranteed.1
                                                                                                                   
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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I.   INTRODUCTION
There are some ideas that seem self-apparent, such as the notion
that states may interpret their own constitutions to expand individ-
ual rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The idea
that the federal Constitution represents the “floor” for individual
rights and that states may set the “ceiling” is beyond dispute.2 How-
ever, there is a lively debate on whether state courts should first look
to their own constitutions when resolving issues, termed the primacy
method of analysis,3 or defer to the interpretations of the United
States Supreme Court.4 This debate is most heated in the criminal
procedure area because of the activism of the Warren Court and the
retrenchment from that activism by the Burger and Rehnquist
courts.5 The controversy has been heightened by recent assertions of
state court independence and an increased willingness for the Su-
preme Court to review these decisions.6 At the debate’s core are his-
torical notions of federalism that have been brought into question,
creating the term “new federalism.”7
                                                                                                                   
2. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (stating that the states have
the power to impose higher standards than those required by the federal Constitution).
3. According to this doctrine the state constitutional claim is decided first. If rights
are protected under state law, the court does not have to examine the federal question or
rely on the federal Constitution. If certain rights are not protected under state law, then
the court looks to the federal Constitution. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and
State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141,
1170 (1985).
4. Compare Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(encouraging states to explore different means to protect individual rights), and Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 705-07 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stressing the impor-
tance of the independence of state constitutions in securing individual rights), with Flor-
ida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[W]hen state courts in-
terpret state law to require more than the federal Constitution requires, the citizens of
the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to ensure rational
law enforcement.”), and Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of
State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 429 (1988) (arguing that a focus
on federalism is not appropriate in state constitutional law).
Notably, Chief Justice Burger generally advocated federalism and the independence of
state constitutions; however, he did not support these notions when states were expanding
on rights that the U.S. Supreme Court had viewed more restrictively, as was the case in
Casal. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court’s constitutionalization of criminal procedure and stressing that “[C]onstitutional
guarantees are trivialized by the insistence on mechanical uniformity between state and
federal practice. There is of course, no reason why the state and federal rules must be the
same.”).
5. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 2-9 (3d ed. 1993).
6. See discussion infra Parts II.D., III.B.3.
7. Federalism is defined as a “[t]erm which includes interrelationships among the
states and relationship between the states and the federal government.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990). “In the Warren era, federalism was unsuccessfully invoked
to support the view of the anti-incorporationists; i.e., that the rights granted in federal
courts need not apply with the same breadth or scope in state courts.” William J. Bren-
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Part II of this Comment examines the history and evolution in the
development of federalism and the role that state constitutions have
assumed. Part III analyzes the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine, which immunizes state court decisions from fed-
eral review. Part IV describes the different methods of constitutional
analysis that states employ. Part V discusses the independence of
Florida’s Constitution and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
Traylor v. State.8 Part VI examines the future of the independent
method of analysis in Florida by focusing on self-incrimination.
II.   FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Until 1789, when the federal Constitution took effect, only state
constitutions protected individuals from government intrusion.9
These state constitutions began with the rights retained by the peo-
ple; only after these rights were enumerated were governments cre-
ated and branches separated.10 Early state bills of rights were there-
fore motivated by an interest in protecting individuals against gov-
ernment intrusion,11 and the federal Bill of Rights drafters looked to
state constitutions for guidance. Many states adopting constitutions
after 1789 modeled their bills of rights on the existing state consti-
tutions rather than their federal counterpart.12
Our federal system, and the principles of federalism, are founded
upon a unique division between the states and the federal govern-
ment.13 State judges swear an oath to uphold both their state consti-
tutions and the federal Constitution.14 When state constitutional
provisions are at issue, state judges have a responsibility to inde-
pendently determine protections afforded under the state constitu-
tion.15 If state judges do not rise to this challenge they denigrate the
principles of federalism that advocate self governance by the states.16
                                                                                                                   
nan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardi-
ans of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 549 (1986). The retreat of the Supreme
Court from the philosophies of the Warren Court has caused federalism to be used as sup-
port for state expansion of constitutional guarantees. See id. at 548.
8. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
9. See Charles G. Douglas, III, Federalism and State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REV.
127, 127 (1988).
10. See id.
11. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 707 n.14 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
12. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. See State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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A.   Historical Role of State Constitutions
For the first century of this nation’s history, state constitutions
protected individual rights from abuse by state authorities.17 As
Judge Skelly Wright noted, “[O]n the whole, for the first century of
our existence as a nation, the state courts, not the federal courts,
stood alone as the champions of our individual liberties.”18 During
this formative period, when state constitutions were the prime pro-
tectors of individual liberties, the Supreme Court relied upon state
courts for guidance in developing federal constitutional law.19
For seventy-five years the federal Constitution only applied to the
actions of the federal government and not to those of the states.20
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court held that the Bill of Rights contained “no expression indicat-
ing an intention to apply them to the state governments.”21 However,
after the Civil War and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court reconsidered this holding.22 For a substantial period of
time the Fourteenth Amendment’s chief impact was on state eco-
nomic legislation.23 Unless faced with a gross abuse of power, the
Court generally left state courts’ decisions alone.24
Thus, “[i]n the beginning, states’ rights were a given.”25 The fed-
eral Bill of Rights was intended to supplement rather than supplant
state constitutions. This resulted in a dual system of protection
founded upon joint state and federal participation to achieve full pro-
tection of individual liberties.26 State constitutions served as feasible
counterparts and protectors of individual liberties within the frame-
work of federalism.27
B.   The Post-Incorporation Years and the Warren Court
Beginning in the 1920s the Supreme Court expressed the view
that some of the protections contained in the federal Bill of Rights
                                                                                                                   
17. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 705 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. J. Skelly Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 166 (1984).
19. See Abrahamson, supra note 3, at 1146.
20. See Douglas, supra note 9, at 129.
21. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
22. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37 (1872) (finding that the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to transfer all the protections of the Bill of
Rights from the states to the federal government).
23. See Douglas, supra note 9, at 130.
24. See id. at 131.
25. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1081, 1081 (1985).
26. See Stephen F. Aton, Note, State Constitutions Realigning Federalism: A Special
Look at Florida , 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 733, 737-38 (1987).
27. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Judicial Federalism: Current Trends and Long-
Term Prospects, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1992).
1997]                         CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS 91
are incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment and are applicable
to the states.28 However, the Court refused to incorporate the com-
plete Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.29 By the 1960s
the historical relation of state bills of rights to the federal Constitu-
tion “had been turned on its head,”30 and a lethargy in state courts’
development of state constitutional law was apparent.31 During Chief
Justice Earl Warren’s tenure on the Supreme Court virtually every
guarantee in the federal Bill of Rights that applied to criminal pro-
cedure was found fundamental to due process of law and was im-
posed on the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment.32
In order to ensure a uniform system of justice nationwide, the
Warren Court made avid use of the incorporation concept previous
decisions had developed as a means of determining which Bill of
Rights guarantees were so fundamental that, as a matter of due
process, they applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.33
As a result of Warren Court decisions, the Court applied the
“minimum” guarantees contained in most of the first eight amend-
ments to the states.34 In turn, this relieved state courts of their re-
sponsibility to construe their own constitutions to develop state
law.35
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights was beneficial to individuals.
However, it reduced the importance of state constitutions by making
                                                                                                                   
28. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stating in dictum that the
rights protected by the First Amendment are among the fundamental liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (employing a “fundamental fair-
ness” test to determine whether a right was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
30. Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1328 (1982) [hereinafter Developments].
31. See Ken Gormley, State Constitutions and Criminal Procedure: A Primer for the
21st Century, 67 OR. L. REV. 689, 691 (1988).
32. The Warren Court imposed the following federal constitutional guarantees upon
the states by incorporating them into the Fourteenth Amendment through the following
cases: In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Fifth Amendment’s reasonable doubt standard
of proof); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment’s ban against double
jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment’s right to jury
trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment’s right to compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth
Amendment’s right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth
Amendment’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962) (Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule).
33. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 2.
34. See Gormley, supra note 31, at 692.
35. See id.
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the federal Constitution the prime protector of individual rights,
significantly altering state constitutional interpretation.36 During
the incorporation of federal guarantees, “[S]tate judges forgot their
own constitutions [and] . . . [s]tate judges started to parrot federal
cases and law clerks researched them to the exclusion of state char-
ters.”37 Consequently, “this revolution in the application and inter-
pretation of federal constitutional law not only rendered ambiguous
the level of protection the state bills of rights afforded, but also
raised the question whether they still served a worthwhile pur-
pose.”38
C.   The Retrenchment of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
The Warren era marked an expansion in individual rights even if
protecting these rights meant that a guilty person was set free.39
However, following four appointments to the Supreme Court by
President Nixon, the Court’s composition changed drastically.40 Be-
ginning with the Burger Court the Court shifted its focus from pro-
tecting individual rights to facilitating law enforcement.41 Finally,
and arguably the most important difference between the Warren
Court and the Burger Court, the Burger Court believed that state
judges could be entrusted to enforce federal constitutional rights.42
The Court’s retreat from the philosophies promulgated by the
Warren Court43 continued under the leadership of Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist.44 The Court continued the move away from the
rights of criminal defendants and has shown a greater sensitivity
toward states’ rights.45 As several commentators noted, “the Su-
preme Court no longer deems itself the keeper of the nation’s con-
science.”46
                                                                                                                   
36. See Aton, supra note 26, at 742; see also WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5,
at 950.
37. Douglas, supra note 9, at 133.
38. Developments, supra note 30, at 1328.
39. See id.
40. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 3.
41. See id. (noting that the Burger Court was more willing to grant government offi-
cials wider latitude when handling criminal cases, stressing the need for effective law en-
forcement).
42. See id. at 7.
43. See Developments, supra note 30, at 1328.
44. See David G. Savage, Opinions on Rehnquist, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 42, 43.
45. See id. (quoting Professor Akhil Reed Amar of Yale Law School).
46. Mosk, supra note 25, at 1087 (citing A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Consti-
tutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 878 (1976); Donald E.
Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421, 421 (1974)).
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D.   The Rise of “New Federalism”
Several state courts have reacted to the Supreme Court’s re-
trenchment the same way they responded to the Warren Court’s ac-
tivism: they have adhered to decisions and adopted the reasoning
handed down by the Supreme Court.47 However, many state courts
have rebelled against the deterioration of the rights guaranteed in
the Warren era by relying on their own constitutions as independent
protectors of individual rights.48 The rationale for state-based deci-
sions is found in the language of the Tenth Amendment: “powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”49 The Court advanced the idea that state law restrictions on
state action may be more stringent than those required under fed-
eral law and that states may expand upon the rights guaranteed in
the federal Constitution.50 This is the strength of federalism—it
provides a double source of protection for individual rights and lib-
erties.51
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., viewed the Burger Court’s dimin-
ished federal scrutiny as a clear invitation to state courts to step into
the breach and increase their own scrutiny.52
Federalism need not be a mean-spirited doctrine that serves only
to limit the scope of human liberty. Rather, it must necessarily be
furthered significantly when state courts thrust themselves into a
position of prominence in the struggle to protect the people of our
nation from governmental intrusions on their freedoms.53
Proponents of this state court revolution rely on historical notions
of federalism, allowing states to interpret their constitutions differ-
                                                                                                                   
47. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 948.
48. See id.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 948.
50. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 705-07 (1986) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (advocating the view that state courts should have primary responsibility for de-
ciding issues arising under their constitutions and statutes); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s
Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) (stating that a state court “is entirely free to read its own
State’s constitution more broadly than [the Supreme] Court reads the Federal Constitu-
tion . . . .”); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 91 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (finding that a state can adopt in its own constitution individual liberties that
are more expansive than those conferred by the federal Constitution); Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Each state has power to impose higher
standards governing police practices under state law than is required by the Federal Con-
stitution.”); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 728 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
that the lower court’s opinion rested in part on independent state grounds with federal
constitutional decisions serving merely as persuasive authority); Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (stating that states are free to adopt a higher standard than the fed-
eral standard in criminal law cases).
51. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 503.
52. See id.
53. Id.
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ently than the federal Constitution.54 What is “new” about this type
of federalism is that states may utilize it to give greater protections
to their citizens than those guaranteed in the federal Constitution.55
The post-Warren Court has curtailed their predecessor’s ground-
breaking decisions, sending a clear message to state courts that fed-
eral standards are not the most progressive approach to protecting
individual rights and liberties.56 As the Supreme Court constricts the
scope of rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, state
courts may exhume state constitutions to adopt more rigorous stan-
dards than those promulgated by the Court.57
This “new federalism” has caused a realigning of philosophies.
Conservatives who historically trumpeted federalism and states’
rights now criticize the expansion of states’ rights,58 while liberals
now praise the notions of federalism that allow states to provide
their citizens more protection than the federal Constitution guaran-
tees.59
Since the demise of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court has
shown a new concern for uniformity when state courts expand con-
stitutional protections.60 The Court does not defend diversity,61 which
was paramount to earlier notions of federalism.
III.   THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND ADEQUATE AND INDEPENDENT
STATE GROUNDS
Independent state constitutional analysis regards Supreme Court
decisions as establishing minimum rather than maximum guaran-
tees.62 There is a strong tendency on the part of states to treat Su-
preme Court decisions as interpreting rights in an absolute sense.63
“But the temptation to jump to this conclusion must not be permitted
                                                                                                                   
54. See Abrahamson, supra note 3, at 1156.
55. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 548.
56. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 951.
57. See id.
58. “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel . . . experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Dissenting justices on the Warren Court “extolled the
virtues of allowing the States to serve as ‘laboratories’ and objected to incorporation as
‘press[ing] the States into a procrustean federal mold.’” Brennan, supra note 7, at 549.
59. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 550.
60. See, e.g., Florida v. Casal, 463 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(reminding the citizens of Florida that when state courts interpret the Florida Constitu-
tion to require more than the federal law requires they can amend their constitution to
ensure rational law enforcement).
61. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 550.
62. See David J. Fine, Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 284 (1973).
63. See id. at 284-85.
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to shield the fact that such an interpretation is not, and cannot be,
compelled by the Supreme Court.”64
A.   The Supremacy Clause Issue
The Supremacy Clause65 requires that inconsistencies between
state and federal law be decided in favor of federal law. As the final
arbiter of federal questions, the Supreme Court may review state
court decisions that are contrary to federal law, even if the state
court relied on its own law.66 “The supremacy of federal law is abso-
lute.”67 Therefore, it is often assumed that the Supremacy Clause
forecloses states from interpreting provisions of their own constitu-
tions, especially when the wording is identical to the federal Consti-
tution.68
However, state constitutions may always be used to expand rights
guaranteed in the federal Constitution.69 However, state constitu-
tions may not be used to undermine or infringe federally guaranteed
constitutional rights because “[f]ederal law sets a minimum floor of
rights below which state courts cannot slip.”70
B.   Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine
For more than a century the Supreme Court has adhered to the
rule that it will not review a state court decision resting on adequate
and independent state grounds. Therefore, a state basing its ruling
on its own constitution can evade Supreme Court oversight as long
as the decision does not infringe upon the minimum guarantees of
the federal Constitution.71 This doctrine protects state court deci-
                                                                                                                   
64. Id. at 285.
65. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
66. See Developments, supra note 30, at 1333.
67. Id. at 1334.
68. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 31, at 696.
69. See id. at 697:
Support for state supplementation of federal policy inheres in the text of the
supremacy clause itself. The clause directs that a state court obey federal law,
“any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing.” When a state law supplements some federal provision, it is not
“contrary” to the federal provision, and execution of the federal law can occur
“notwithstanding” state law.
70. Id.
71. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945):
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it
will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independ-
ent state grounds. . . . The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought
to warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the
state and federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdic-
tion. Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that
they incorrectly adjudge federal rights.
Id. at 125-26; see also WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 961.
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sions that construe state constitutions to afford greater protection to
individual rights than does the federal Constitution.72
1.   Background
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine stems from
article III of the federal Constitution, which extends judicial power
to cases that arise under the Constitution.73 When a state court rests
its decision on state law without violating the Supremacy Clause,
there is no “case or controversy” within the definition of article III,
thus removing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review the deci-
sion.74 Traditionally, if a state court decision did not clearly rest on
state grounds the Court would presume state grounds and decline
review, or remand the case back to the state for further considera-
tion.75 Historically, the presumption was strong that a decision was
based on adequate and independent state grounds, even if the state
court relied on federal precedent.76 “The reason for this deferential
treatment was apparently to allow states to exercise their proper
role in the dual system of federalism.”77 However, deferential treat-
ment to state courts vanished in the early 1980s when state courts,
refusing to follow the retrenchment of the Burger Court, began using
the doctrine to insulate opinions by expanding individual rights un-
der state constitutions.78
2.   Michigan v. Long
In Michigan v. Long ,79 apparently frustrated by state court activ-
ism,80 the Burger Court held that a state decision must clearly rest
on independent state grounds to remove the Court’s jurisdiction.81
                                                                                                                   
72. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 961.
73. Judicial power extends “to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Con-
stitution.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
74. See Aton, supra note 26, at 743-44.
75. See Herb, 324 U.S. at 126-27.
76. See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 553 (1940) (noting that the
state court did not rely on any specific provision of its own constitution and cited federal
cases); see also Aton, supra note 26, at 746.
77. Aton, supra note 26, at 746.
78. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983), the Court placed the burden
on the state court to show that its decision was based on independent state law grounds.
The Court emphasized that if a state court refers to federal precedent in its decision, then
it must make a plain statement that it is only using the federal decisions as guides. If the
state court does not make an adequate plain statement, then the Court is not barred from
reviewing the decision. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, argued that tradition-
ally the presumption has been against asserting jurisdiction over a case that might have
been decided on an independent state law ground. See id. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
79. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
80. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 961-62.
81. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
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[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as
the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the
case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it
to do so. If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal prece-
dents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then
it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or
opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose
of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court
has reached.82
In Long, the Supreme Court reviewed the case despite the fact
that the Michigan Supreme Court held a vehicle search invalid be-
cause it was “proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article 1, section 11 of the Michigan Consti-
tution.”83 The Court was not convinced that the decision rested on
grounds independent of federal law and found that the state court
relied on the federal Constitution when applying its own law.84
After Long, Justice Brennan noted that many critics feared that
the Court would become hostile to state courts’ protection of individ-
ual rights and would thus refuse to find independent state grounds,
allowing the Court to interfere in these cases.85 Justice Brennan
stated, however, that he was not so pessimistic. He believed the
Court had set appropriate ground rules for federalism and was con-
vinced that if a state court clearly rested its opinion on state
grounds, the Supreme Court would honor the decision.86 Based upon
the recent decisions of the Rehnquist Court it appears that Justice
Brennan’s faith was misplaced.
3.   Impact of the Plain Statement Requirement
In Arizona v. Evans ,87 the Supreme Court reviewed whether the
state supreme court erred when it suppressed evidence obtained due
to a clerical error committed not by the arresting officer but by a
court employee.88 The Court asserted jurisdiction because it deter-
mined that indications it relied primarily on Arizona’s “good-faith”
statute rather than the Fourth Amendment.89 The Supreme Court
                                                                                                                   
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1037 n.3 (emphasis added).
84. See id. at 1043-44.
85. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 551.
86. See id. at 552.
87. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
88. See id. at 4. The court employee committed a clerical error, resulting in an inva-
lid arrest warrant.
89. See id. at 9-10.
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determined that the state supreme court’s decision to invoke the ex-
clusionary rule was “based squarely upon its interpretation of fed-
eral law”90 and the Court reversed the Arizona court’s decision.91
In Pennsylvania v. Labron ,92 the Court further narrowed the plain
statement rule. In Labron, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sup-
pressed evidence obtained in a warrantless automobile search.93 Un-
der the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
this search fell into the automobile exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s warrant requirement.94 However, in an attempt to secure
greater protections for its citizens, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
suppressed the evidence by basing its opinion on “this Common-
wealth’s jurisprudence of the automobile exception.”95 The United
States Supreme Court found that the state supreme court did not
clearly base its opinion on independent state grounds.96
Thus, according to Labron, a statement that the court is relying
on its own jurisprudence is not enough to satisfy the plain statement
requirement.97 The Court acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court discussed its own decisions.98 The problem, as the Court
saw it, was that many of the state precedents the Pennsylvania Su-
                                                                                                                   
[W]e conclude that we have jurisdiction. In reversing the Court of Appeals, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated that “[w]hile it may be inappropriate to invoke
the exclusionary rule where a magistrate has issued a facially valid warrant (a
discretionary judicial function) based on an erroneous evaluation of the facts,
the law, or both, it is useful and proper to do so where negligent record keep-
ing (a purely clerical function) results in an unlawful arrest.” Thus, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court’s decision to suppress the evidence was based squarely
upon its interpretation of federal law. Nor did it offer a plain statement that
its references to federal law were “being used only for the purpose of guidance,
and d[id] not themselves compel.”
(citations omitted); but see State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 871 (Ariz. 1994) (stating that
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), which established that it is not mandatory for
courts to suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment due to an invalid
search warrant, and which was relied on by the appeals court, was “not helpful” to the
court’s analysis).
90. Evans, 514 U.S. at 10.
91. See id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated that she would overrule
Long. See id. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg supports the opposite of
the plain statement rule—that absent a plain statement to the contrary, a state court’s
decision, like the one in this case, rests on independent state law grounds. See id. at 26.
Justice Ginsburg was concerned that the application of the Long presumption increased
the number of Supreme Court decisions that were not dispositive, because on remand the
state courts merely reinstated their prior judgments after clarifying the reliance on state
grounds with a “plain statement.” See id. at 33. However, what troubled Justice Ginsburg
most notably was that the Long presumption interfered “prematurely with state-court en-
deavors to explore different solutions to new problems facing modern society.” Id.
92. 116 S. Ct. 2485 (1996).
93. See id. at 2486.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 2487.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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preme Court based its decision on relied on United States Supreme
Court decisions.99 Therefore, the Court stated, “[t]he law of the
Commonwealth thus appears to us ‘interwoven with the federal law,
and . . . the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.’”100
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens noted that “given the
explicit and nearly exclusive references to state law,” the Court’s de-
cision to review this case “not only extends Michigan v. Long  beyond
its original scope, but it stands its rationale on its head.”101 Justice
Stevens emphasized that the state court “expressly indicated [an] in-
tent to extend the protections of its constitution beyond those avail-
able under the Federal Constitution.”102 The majority’s opinion was
particularly unnecessary103 and showed a lack of respect for the state
court’s independence.104
These cases demonstrate a new interest in uniformity by a Court
that usually extols the virtues of federalism and states’ rights.105 It
appears the value of federalism and state independence is not as
high when states are asserting themselves as the protectors of indi-
vidual rights and granting their citizens more freedom than the Su-
preme Court. Therefore, it seems that criticism of Long is warranted.
4.   State Court Reaction to the Plain Statement Requirement
In response to the Court’s broad interpretation of the scope of
Long and the strict reading of the plain statement requirement,106
states have begun to put blanket disclaimers in their opinions. The
New Hampshire Supreme Court routinely puts the following state-
ments in all of its decisions involving state constitutional issues: “We
hereby make clear that when this court cites federal or other State
court opinions in construing provisions of the New Hampshire Con-
stitution or statutes, we rely on those precedents merely for guidance
and do not consider our results bound by those decisions.”107
                                                                                                                   
99. See id.
100. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)).
101. Id. at 2490 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2492.
103. See id. at 2491-92 (“The harms are particularly unnecessary given the likely re-
sult on remand. . . . While the result will be identical, resources and respect will have
been unnecessarily lost.”).
104. See id.
105. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 549-50.
106. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983); see also State v. Grant-Chase, 665
A.2d 380, 382 (N.H. 1995) (citing State v. Maya, 493 A.2d 1139, 1143 (N.H. 1985): “We cite
‘decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of courts of other jurisdictions
for their helpfulness in analyzing and deciding the State issue.’”); State v. Chaisson, 486
A.2d 297, 301 (N.H. 1984) (“In construing the State Constitution, we refer to federal con-
stitutional law as only the benchmark of minimum constitutional protection.”).
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Several other states have followed the lead of New Hampshire
and put disclaimers in their decisions.108 In State v. Jewett,109 the
Vermont Supreme Court sent a warning to litigators about the dan-
ger of using federal cases when briefing state constitutional issues
and advised them against stating that any federal case “compelled” a
certain result.110 The court advised the lower New Hampshire state
courts to cite to federal cases helpful for their logic and reasoning but
only for that limited purpose.111
IV.   METHODS OF STATE COURT ANALYSIS
The first step in “new federalism” is for state courts to base their
decisions on their own constitutions.112 This entails state courts con-
sidering their own constitution before the federal Constitution, or as
Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court noted, state consti-
tutions are first in both time and logic.113 However, the amount of in-
dependence a state court asserts depends on the method of constitu-
tional analysis the state employs.114 There are generally three meth-
ods of state constitutional interpretation: lock-step, interstitial, and
primacy.115
A.   Lock-Step/Dependent Approach
Under a lock-step approach, a state court ties itself, on one or
more issues, to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.116
If the federal Constitution protects a specific right, then the state
court follows this precedent, as required under the Supremacy
Clause.117 However, if the federal Constitution does not protect a cer-
tain right, the state court follows this precedent without doing an in-
dependent interpretation of its state constitution.118 Some state
courts impose the lock-step doctrine upon themselves,119 while other
                                                                                                                   
108. See, e.g., Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 405 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc)
(referring to federal constitutional law only as the benchmark of minimum protection).
109. 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985).
110. Id. at 238.
111. See id.
112. See Ted M. Benn, Individual Rights and State Constitutional Interpretations:
Putting First Things First , 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 493, 507 (1985).
113. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379, 380 (1980).
114. See Benn, supra note 112, at 507.
115. See Aton, supra note 26, at 764.
116. See id.
117. See State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 6 (N.M. 1997).
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., People v. Kimery, 676 N.E.2d 656, 664 (Ill. 1997) (Nickels, J., dissent-
ing) (“We are bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s decisions on matters of
federal constitutional law. However, the obligation to apply those decisions when inter-
preting parallel provisions of our state constitution is one that this court has imposed
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states have provisions in their constitutions requiring state courts to
follow Supreme Court jurisprudence.120
When states follow federal jurisprudence in lock-step, the Su-
preme Court, not the state court, determines the degree of protection
state citizens receive.121 In reality, state courts assume the role of a
“mimicking court jester”122 when their constitutions are placed in
lock-step with the decisions of the Supreme Court. Deferential con-
formity to federal precedent is contrary to the history of federal and
state bills of rights, inconsistent with notions of federalism, under-
cuts the state judge’s oath to uphold the state constitution,123 and
raises the question of whether state bills of rights serve a worthwhile
purpose.124
B.   Interstitial/Supplemental Approach
States employing an interstitial method of analysis consider the
federal Constitution issue first. If the federal Constitution does not
protect a certain right the state court looks to the state’s constitu-
                                                                                                                   
upon itself under the so-called ‘lock step doctrine.’”); Gomez, 932 P.2d at 6-7 (stating that
for several decades New Mexico also interpreted their constitution in lock-step with fed-
eral precedent; however, the court rejected the method in this case).
120. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (amended 1982). The amendment begins with word-
ing identical to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but then adds:
“This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Id.
121. See Benn, supra note 112, at 507.
122. Id. An example of the Florida Supreme Court acting as a “mimicking court jester”
is apparent in Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1993). In Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d
988, 991 (Fla. 1988), the court stated that because of the 1982 amendment which required
the state to follow the interpretations of the United States Supreme Court on issues in-
volving the Fourth Amendment, Florida courts were subsequently bound to prospective
decisions of the Supreme Court. The impact of this holding was felt in Perez: “[I]n what
must be the first time in history, this Court is issuing a majority decision with which the
majority disagrees.” Perez, 620 So. 2d at 1262 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Because of the
1982 amendment and its decision in Bernie, the Florida Supreme Court is bound to rele-
vant Supreme Court decisions, even when the court does not agree with those decisions
and even if a different outcome would be reached under the state constitution.
In his dissenting opinion in Perez, Justice Kogan noted that at the time Bernie was writ-
ten, the Supreme Court had not begun to “retreat from its own precedent that character-
izes the nation’s high Court today. . . . Few could have foreseen the extent of the high
Court’s recent activities.” Id. at 1270 (Kogan, J., dissenting). Justice Kogan further
pointed out that the implication of the 1982 amendment, coupled with the court’s decision
in Bernie, required “that the authority to interpret part of the Florida Constitution is
vested exclusively in the United States Supreme Court,” a proposition that Justice Kogan
found defied logic, “stretched credulity beyond the stars,” and was absurd. Id. at 1271-72.
123. See Abrahamson, supra note 3, at 1168.
124. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 30, at 1328; see also Perez, 620 So. 2d at 1272
(Kogan, J., dissenting) (stating that the lock-step approach vests authority to interpret
part of the Florida Constitution exclusively in the United States Supreme Court, nullify-
ing that part of the state constitution).
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tion.125 In other words, if a right is protected under the federal Con-
stitution, the state court will not consider its own constitution. State
courts using an interstitial method of analysis can diverge from fed-
eral precedent because of flawed federal analysis, structural differ-
ences between state and federal constitutional provisions, or dis-
tinctive state characteristics.126 Thus, the state constitution serves as
additional or supplemental protection for individual rights.127
This approach allows state courts to assume a moderately inde-
pendent role and still preserve a degree of uniformity.128 However, a
state court using this method “renounces its federalistic powers and
submits to the judgment of the Supreme Court.”129
In practice, this approach is not very different from the dependent
lock-step approach because federal law is so pervasive that com-
paratively few gaps remain for a state willing to let the Supreme
Court settle its law. On the other hand, state constitutions can re-
solve many issues, and foreclosing the option of considering state
arguments dissolves the essence of federalism by abrogating the
state’s responsibility to provide the other half of the dual protec-
tion.130
In essence, the “floor” set by the federal Constitution becomes the
state’s “ceiling” because the state court will not attempt to build its
own body of state constitutional law.131
C.   Primacy/Independent Approach
States adopting the primacy method of analysis first look to their
own constitution and only refer to the federal Constitution if a cer-
tain right is not protected under state law.132 “The proper sequence is
                                                                                                                   
125. See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 3, at 1171 (stating that a court will turn to a
state constitution only if the federal constitution does not adequately protect a defendant).
126. See State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997).
127. See Benn, supra note 112, at 507.
128. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. 1982). In Hunt, the court stated
that the function of state constitutions is to serve as a second line of defense for those
rights protected by the federal Constitution. See id. at 955. Therefore, only strong policy
reasons justify a departure from federal precedent. See id. The court recognized that no-
tions of federalism justify the departure; however, it noted that divergent paths are unsat-
isfactory to the public and it stressed the need for application of uniform rules of criminal
procedure. See id.; Benn, supra note 112, at 508.
129. Aton, supra note 26, at 768.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., id. (stating that under an independent approach to federalism questions,
a state “only reaches the federal Constitution when the issues cannot be resolved under
state law”). Some of the states utilizing a primacy analysis include: Large v. Superior Ct.,
714 P.2d 399, 405 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (Haw. 1994); State v.
Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 751 (La. 1992); City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me.
1985); State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 1255 (Mont. 1986); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347,
350-52 (N.H. 1983); State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Or. 1983); Autran v. State,
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to analyze the state’s law, including its constitutional law, before
reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is required . . . because
the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Consti-
tution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state
law.”133
“State bills of rights are first in two senses: first in time and first
in logic.”134 Historically, state bills of rights were first in time as pro-
tectors of individual rights and liberties. It follows that state courts
should look to their own laws first for reasons of constitutional
logic.135 When state courts rely upon their own constitutions they do
not reach federal questions unless certain rights are not protected by
state laws.136 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court often
exercises restraint in construing the extent of protection of the fed-
eral Constitution.137 Therefore, it is entirely appropriate for state
courts to look to their own constitutions first to determine if individ-
ual rights should require more protection than federal law guaran-
tees.
The Supreme Court often exercises restraint because its prece-
dent binds all states to a guaranteed “minimum” protection of rights,
precluding further experimentation below the established floor.138
Additionally, decisions suitable in some states may not be suitable in
others, because the Court is ill-equipped to familiarize itself with lo-
cal problems, conditions, and traditions of all fifty states.139 States,
however, are not faced with these same prudential concerns.140 State
court decisions only bind the courts within the state; one state’s
precedent will not foreclose experimentation in other jurisdictions.141
Furthermore, no other court is more sensitive or responsible to the
needs of diverse localities within a state, or the state as a whole,
than that state’s own high court.142
Overall, the independent approach taken by an increasing number
of states best preserves the meaning and purpose of federalism. By
                                                                                                                   
887 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 238 (Vt. 1985);
State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353, 361-62 (Wash. 1984).
133. State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 1255 (Mont. 1986).
134. Linde, supra note 113, at 380.
135. See Wallace P. Carson, Jr., “Last Things Last”: A Methodological Approach to Le-
gal Argument in State Courts, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 641, 648 (1983) (“[T]he United
States Constitution is the supreme law of the land.”). However an independent analysis of
state constitutions does not diminish the supremacy of federal rights because nothing in a
state law or state constitution can infringe upon federally guaranteed rights. See id.
136. See, e.g., id. at 648.
137. See, e.g., Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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allowing each state to decide independently what protections it
will provide, rather than merely parroting the views of the Su-
preme Court, state residents receive the benefit of the dual pro-
tection of federalism, and have a judiciary that is both accountable
to them and mindful of their special history, culture, and tradi-
tion.143
1.   Perceived Dangers in an Independent Analysis
The most common criticism of state usage of the primacy doctrine
is that it is result-oriented.144 Critics regard “deviation from the fed-
eral standard [as being] based on ideology, not sound constitutional
doctrine.”145 Many commentators view “new federalism” as an ideo-
logical reaction to the Supreme Court’s departure from the policies
promulgated by the Warren Court and not as an objective attempt to
cultivate a coherent state constitutional doctrine.146
If state courts consistently look to their state constitutions first
when constitutional issues are raised, and make a principled deci-
sion based on state law, then they are not selectively using their
state constitutions merely to reach a certain outcome. “As long as the
state court is reasonably consistent, the criticism of a lack of neutral
principles is groundless, and amounts to nothing more than a plea
for consistency with federal case law.”147
2.   Perceived Dangers in Diversity
Many critics view the diversity inherent in an independent
analysis with skepticism.148 These critics see no need for the state to
deviate from Supreme Court decisions and prefer that state courts
conform their law to the federal law.149 According to this view, inde-
                                                                                                                   
143. Aton, supra note 26, at 771.
144. See, e.g., West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1005 (Utah 1994) (stating
that the court had not developed a consistent approach for cases in which both state and
federal constitutional claims were made and was criticized for being result-oriented);
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 1985) (stating that it would be a mistake for the
court to use its state constitution to evade the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and that its decisions must be principled, not result-oriented).
145. Abrahamson, supra note 3, at 1178.
146. See, e.g., WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 959 (“Many commentators
view the current renaissance in state constitutional litigation as an ideological reaction to
the retrenchment of the United States Supreme Court, rather than as an objective effort
to develop state constitutional doctrine.”).
147. Aton, supra note 26, at 756.
148. See, e.g., WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 956-59 (rebutting arguments
commonly advanced to support such an independent analysis).
149. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV.
995, 1005-06 (1985) (arguing that there is no need for double constitutional protections).
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pendent state constitutional analysis undercuts the need for uni-
formity with federal law and creates uncertainty.150
“Uniformity must be distinguished from consistency.”151 Uniform-
ity requires laws to be the same in all jurisdictions. Consistency,
however, “pertains to a system whose laws do not contradict each
other, but fit together in the overall scheme of the system.”152 Our
system of dual protection does not require that the laws throughout
the fifty states be uniform.153 Thus, it is possible for an individual
state to be internally consistent without being uniform with federal
jurisprudence.154
Federalism requires uniformity in only one aspect—federally
guaranteed constitutional rights are the irreducible minimum that
must be honored throughout the country. A higher standard only
applies in the occasional situations where a state court actually
raises this minimum.155 “In short, only one standard will apply to
state officials at any given time.”156 Thus, even if a uniform applica-
tion of laws was attainable in our system of federalism and dual pro-
tection, the claim that uncertainty results from laws that may not be
uniform, but are consistent, is greatly exaggerated.157
V.   PUTTING FIRST THINGS FIRST: FLORIDA’S CONSTITUTION
The Florida Supreme Court recognized the importance and
strength of utilizing the Florida Constitution as the primary protec-
tor of rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but failed to develop a
detailed primacy analysis.158 In 1992, the Florida Supreme Court fi-
nally laid the foundation for a meaningful independent analysis of
the state constitution;159 however, the court has yet to apply its own
methodology in a significant fashion.160
                                                                                                                   
150. See, e.g., People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20, 33 (Colo. 1984) (Erickson, J., dissenting)
(stating that police officers should be able to rely on decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court); State v. Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240, 1250 (Wash. 1983) (Dimmick, J., dissenting)
(stressing the need for uniform application of laws); Benn, supra note 112, at 508 (stating
that uniformity of the law is often a worthwhile goal).
151. Aton, supra note 26, at 762.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 5, at 957.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See discussion infra Part V.A.
159. See discussion infra Part V.B.
160. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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A.   Origins of Primacy in Florida
The emergence of the primacy doctrine in Florida occurred in the
context of privacy rights. In In re T.W.,161 the Florida Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a state statute requiring parental
consent for a minor to obtain an abortion.162 The court struck down
the statute, finding that it violated the privacy provision of Florida’s
Constitution.163 The court stated that if the Florida Constitution
failed to protect a minor’s right to choose an abortion without paren-
tal consent, only then would it consider whether that right was pro-
tected under the federal Constitution.164
In In re Guardianship of Browning ,165 the Florida Supreme Court
upheld the right of the guardian of an incompetent patient suffering
from an incurable terminal disease to order life-prolonging medical
procedures to be withheld from the patient.166 The court relied on its
finding in In re T.W. that Florida’s privacy provision was more ex-
pansive than any implicit right of privacy contained in the federal
Constitution.167
These two cases used the Florida Constitution as the primary
basis for protecting individual rights. However, neither provided an
in-depth analysis of the primacy approach, and neither truly relied
on a state-based legal analysis, which is the essence of an independ-
ent determination of a state constitutional provision.168 Both cases
relied on federal constitutional law, national legal policy, and an ex-
ternal, common law style legal analysis.169
B.   A True Independent Determination
In Traylor v. State,170 a convicted murderer challenged the ad-
missibility of his confessions at trial, claiming the police violated his
right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination.171 Although
the court did not find for the defendant, it thoroughly analyzed the
state constitution and explicitly adopted a primacy analysis.172
Previously, the court’s primacy decisions involved the state con-
stitution’s privacy provision. Comparatively, the federal Constitution
                                                                                                                   
161. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
162. See id. at 1189.
163. See id. at 1196.
164. See id.
165. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
166. See id. at 7-8.
167. See id. at 8.
168. See Daniel Gordon, Good Intentions—Questionable Results: Florida Tries the
Primacy Model, 18 NOVA L. REV. 759, 764-66 (1994).
169. See id.
170. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
171. See id. at 960-61.
172. See id. at 961-66.
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does not contain an explicit protection of privacy. However, Traylor
involved article 1, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, which con-
tains the same wording as the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.173 The decision reflects the court’s recognition
that primacy applies to more than just state constitutional provi-
sions that differ from the federal Constitution; the analysis applies
even when state constitutional provisions are similar or identical to
their federal counterparts.174
The Traylor court stated that every phrase and every clause of
the state constitution is to be given an independent interpretation.175
The court developed an explicit methodology for construing Florida’s
Bill of Rights, requiring state courts to focus on factors unique to the
experience of the state.176 When utilizing a primacy analysis, courts
should rely on the “express language of the [state] constitutional
provision, its formative history, both preexisting and developing
state law, evolving customs, traditions and attitudes within the
state, the state’s own general history, and finally any external influ-
ences that may have shaped state law.”177
The methodology set out in Traylor is important because it pro-
vides the lower courts with a step-by-step guide to using a state-
based legal analysis. State courts can avoid many of the criticisms
that accompany independent state constitutional interpretation if
the analysis is scrupulously followed.178 Traylor also gives lawyers a
guide for raising state constitutional issues in state court, a practice
that all but vanished in the Warren era.
C.   Application of Primacy After Traylor v. State
Less than one month after the decision in Traylor, the Florida
Supreme Court reviewed Herrera v. State.179 The court considered
whether a Florida jury instruction unconstitutionally shifted the
burden of proving the affirmative defense of entrapment to the de-
fendant.180 The court held that the allocation of this burden to the de-
                                                                                                                   
173. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .”), with FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself.”).
174. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962-63.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 962.
177. Id.
178. See supra Parts IV.C.1-2.
179. See 594 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1992).
180. See id. at 276.
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fendant was not unconstitutional.181 However, in arriving at this de-
cision, the court merely recited federal law and stated that earlier
Florida cases recognized the principles set out in the federal prece-
dent.182
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kogan expressed his concern
that the court did not honor its own doctrine of primacy.183 Under the
Traylor doctrine, state courts are required to consider state consti-
tutional issues first, and to address federal questions only if the is-
sues are not resolved under the state constitution.184 Justice Kogan
stressed that “when state issues are properly raised and briefed, this
Court has a duty and an obligation to honor its own doctrine of pri-
macy.”185
Two years later, in B.H. v. State,186 the supreme court analyzed
the role of an administrative agency in defining the elements of a
crime.187 Because the B.H. court disagreed with the federal law, it
turned to the Florida law.188 The court performed a thorough analy-
sis of the Florida Constitution and Florida law189 and found the stat-
ute unconstitutional because it delegated authority to the adminis-
trative agency.190
Critics of an independent state constitutional analysis could cite
to Herrera and B.H. to support their criticism that the primacy
model is result-oriented.191 In Herrera, federal precedent supported
the court’s holding; there was no need to discuss the Florida Consti-
tution.192 In B.H., the court was not satisfied with the federal juris-
prudence, so it analyzed the issue under the state constitution.193
Critics also claim that independent analysis breeds uncertainty.194
In Herrera, state law issues were raised and briefed; however, they
were not addressed.195 In B.H., instead of employing the primacy
model the court had earlier advanced, it used an interstitial analysis
where the court first looks to federal law and then to state law.196
                                                                                                                   
181. See id. at 278.
182. See id. at 277-78.
183. See id. at 279-80 (Kogan, J., concurring) (stating that the question presented to
the court is a far more serious issue of Florida constitutional law, which the court did not
address).
184. See id. at 279.
185. Id.
186. 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994).
187. See id. at 990.
188. See id. at 991.
189. See id. at 991-94.
190. See id. at 994.
191. See supra Part IV.C.1.
192. See Herrera v. State, 594 So. 2d 275, 277-78 (Fla. 1992).
193. See B.H., 645 So. 2d at 991.
194. See supra Part IV.C.2.
195. See Herrera, 594 So. 2d at 279 (Kogan, J., concurring).
196. See B.H., 645 So. 2d at 991.
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Therefore, it is not clear if, or when, the court will independently in-
terpret the Florida Constitution.
These criticisms could be cured by consistently applying the pri-
macy analysis set forth in Traylor. Consistency avoids the appear-
ance that the court uses primacy only when it seeks to reach a de-
sired result, and eliminates the uncertainties surrounding the law
and the method of analysis that state courts should apply.197
VI.   SELF-INCRIMINATION: A GUIDE TO THE FATE OF PRIMACY IN
FLORIDA
The primacy model crafted by the Florida Supreme Court in Tray-
lor was primed for examination and elucidation in the case of State
v. Owen (Owen II).198 Instead, after Owen II, the future of primacy is
unclear.199
A.   Background
During its initial review of the Owen case in 1990,200 the Florida
Supreme Court held that when a suspect in a custodial interrogation
makes an equivocal assertion of the Miranda201 right to terminate
questioning or have a lawyer present for further questioning, police
may only ask clarifying questions to determine the true intent of the
statement.202 Thus, the Owen I court reversed the conviction and re-
manded for a new trial because the defendant said “I’d rather not
talk about it,” an equivocal request to terminate the questioning.203
At this point, under Miranda, the police were limited to asking clari-
fying questions.204 However, they continued with the interrogation,
rendering further statements inadmissible.205
In Traylor, the supreme court adopted a primacy model of consti-
tutional analysis and applied it to the self-incrimination provision of
the state constitution.206 Based upon independent analysis of state
constitutional law, the court found that if a suspect indicates in any
manner, even equivocally or ambiguously, that he or she does not
                                                                                                                   
197. See supra Parts IV.C.1-2.
198. 22 Fla. L. Weekly S246 (Fla. May 8, 1997) (answering the certified question of
whether the principles announced by the United States Supreme Court in Davis applied
to the admissibility of confessions in Florida in light of Traylor) (Owen II).
199. See infra Parts VI.D.1-3.
200. See Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1990) (Owen I).
201. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that a suspect in custodial
interrogation must be made aware of his right to assistance of counsel and to terminate
questioning).
202. See Owen I, 560 So. 2d at 211.
203. See id. at 210-11.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 964-66 (Fla. 1992).
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want to be questioned, the interrogation must stop.207 However, the
court found that the defendant never indicated a desire to consult
with a lawyer or to stop the interrogation.208 In other words, there
was not even an equivocal invocation of Miranda rights; therefore,
the right against self-incrimination was not violated.209
B.   United States Supreme Court Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence
In Davis v. United States ,210 the Supreme Court held that unless a
suspect unequivocally invokes Miranda rights, an interrogation may
continue and the police do not have any obligation to ask clarifying
questions.211 The Court found that the defendant’s statement in
Davis, “maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was not an unequivocal re-
quest for counsel.212 Thus, the Court stated, it was entirely appropri-
ate for the police to continue the interrogation.213 The Court observed
that “a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel
or it is not.”214
Compelled by a need to facilitate law enforcement the Davis
Court gave police officers an easily followed “bright line” rule: if the
assertion is equivocal or ambiguous, the officer may continue the in-
terrogation without clarification.215 Although the court recognized
that it is good police practice for the interviewing officers to seek
clarification if the suspect makes an ambiguous statement, such
clarification is not mandated.216
C.   Florida’s Reaction to Davis v. United States
Initially, the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Davis
caused confusion in Florida’s state courts. Deck v. State217 illustrates
the confusion in the initial treatment of the Davis decision. In its
first opinion, the Deck court reversed a conviction because the trial
court admitted into evidence a confession made after the defendant
unequivocally asserted a desire to terminate the questioning.218 Two
months later, the state brought a rehearing motion urging reconsid-
eration in light of Davis. The district court substituted its earlier
                                                                                                                   
207. See id. at 966.
208. See id. at 971-72.
209. See id. at 972.
210. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
211. See id. at 459.
212. Id. at 462.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 459 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984)).
215. See id. at 461.
216. See id.
217. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D37 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 22, 1994), withdrawn and substituted
by 20 Fla. L. Weekly D399 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 10, 1995).
218. See Deck, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D37.
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opinion and merely parroted the opinion of the Supreme Court,
finding that Davis precluded the earlier result.219
The defendant moved for yet another rehearing, arguing the
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Traylor, overlooked by the dis-
trict court, directly addressed the issue and was dispositive.220 In its
third opinion, the court affirmed the suppression based on Traylor
and stated that according to Florida’s primacy doctrine, when a fun-
damental right is created by the state constitution it must be re-
spected even if no similar right is recognized by the federal courts.221
Even though there was some initial confusion regarding the sig-
nificance of Davis, all the district courts have followed the Florida
Supreme Court’s decisions in Owen I and Traylor. However, at least
one district expressed concern over the impact that Davis has on
state self-incrimination jurisprudence.222
In Owen I the Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
remanded for a new trial, but before retrial the state moved for re-
consideration in light of the intervening decision of the Supreme
Court in Davis.223 The Fourth District Court of Appeal denied the re-
hearing, but found, in Owen II, that the statements made during
Owen’s confessions would not make the confession inadmissible un-
der Davis; the confession would only be inadmissible if Traylor was
controlling.224 The court opined that the significance of Davis was
unclear because the Florida Supreme Court relied on federal law in
its Traylor decision.225 Therefore, the court certified the issue of ad-
missibility to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great impor-
tance.226
At least one other state has rejected the Davis rule and opted for
the clarification approach.227 However, most states that have decided
                                                                                                                   
219. See Deck, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D399 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 10, 1995), withdrawn and
substituted by 653 So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
220. See Deck v. State, 653 So. 2d 435, 436-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
221. See id. at 437.
222. See Almeida v. State, 687 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (certifying the question
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ida Supreme Court’s decision in Traylor).
223. See State v. Owen, 654 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (Owen II).
224. See id. at 202.
225. See id.
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THE PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN
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the issue have adhered to the Court’s decision in Davis,228 although
none of these did so through an independent determination of their
state constitution.229 Other state courts have gone to great lengths to
distinguish Davis,230 or have found the question not dispositive, thus
never reaching the issue.231
D.   Resolution by the Florida Supreme Court?
When the Florida Supreme Court considered the certified ques-
tion presented by Owen II it had the opportunity to solidify the pri-
macy model as Florida’s method of choice in constitutional interpre-
tation.232 The court could have sent a clear message to the lower
courts that the Florida Constitution truly is the first and foremost
protector of individual liberties and rights. Instead, Owen II indi-
cates that the Traylor primacy doctrine was merely the means to
reach a desired outcome and was not as expansive as the court origi-
nally proclaimed.233
1.   The Court’s Decision in State v. Owen (Owen II)
In Owen II, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the Davis stan-
dard, holding that Florida’s Constitution “does not place greater re-
strictions on law enforcement than those mandated under federal
law.”234 The court changed the emphasis from its earlier opinion in
Owen I, finding the result was based on federal law and now re-
quired a different result “post-Davis.”’ The court opined that even
though its “analysis in Traylor was grounded in the Florida Consti-
tution, [its] conclusions were no different than those set forth in
prior holdings of the United States Supreme Court.”235
                                                                                                                   
228. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277 (Minn. 1995); State v. Panetti, 891
S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54 (Vt. 1995); State v. Long,
526 N.W.2d 826 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
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questions); see also Long, 526 N.W.2d at 830 n.3 (leaving the question of whether the Wis-
consin Constitution grants more rights than Davis for another day).
232. See State v. Owen, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S246, S247 (Fla. May 8, 1997).
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the United States Supreme Court.”).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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In turning first to federal law, the Owen II court ignored the pri-
macy analysis promulgated in Traylor. The majority opinion does not
even mention primacy.  The singular importance of Traylor was that
it “reminded” the court it could reaffirm Owen I regardless of federal
law.236 However, the court chose not to do so and did not attempt a
primacy analysis.237
Justice Shaw’s concurrence attempted to honor the court’s opinion
in Traylor by applying a primacy analysis.238 He sought to clarify
what constituted a clear invocation of Miranda rights in Florida.239
In making that determination, Justice Shaw applied article I, section
9 of the Florida Constitution and looked to the unique characteristics
of Florida, finding that a suspect invokes Miranda rights when a
reasonable person would conclude that the suspect expressed a de-
sire to stop the questioning.240
Chief Justice Kogan’s dissent noted that the Davis standard does
not adequately protect the rights of the accused.241 He stressed that
the original approach adopted in Owen I better protects individual
rights.242 Unlike the majority opinion, which stated that its earlier
Owen I opinion was based on federal law, Chief Justice Kogan wrote
that article I, section 9 of Florida’s Constitution played a significant
part in the earlier opinion.243 Because the court’s initial decision in
Owen I better protected the rights of individuals, and because article
I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provided a basis for the con-
tinuation of this approach, Chief Justice Kogan would exercise the
court’s authority under Traylor and reaffirm Owen I.244
2.   Analysis of Owen II
Traylor focused on the protection of individual rights.245 While
recognizing the importance of facilitating law enforcement, the court
found the protection of individual rights to be paramount.246 The
court stated that it was “bound under [Florida’s] Declaration of
Rights to construe each provision freely in order to achieve the pri-
mary goal of individual freedom and autonomy.”247
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114 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:87
In contrast, in Davis, the Supreme Court explicitly chose to em-
phasize the other side of the equation—the need for effective law en-
forcement rather than the protection of individual rights.248 The
Davis Court refused to impose “difficult judgment calls” upon the
police to determine whether a suspect actually wants a lawyer, even
when one is not unequivocally requested.249
Historically, facilitating the tasks of law enforcement has not
been the primary emphasis of Florida constitutional protection. As
the supreme court noted in Traylor, “[w]here the rights of those sus-
pected of wrongdoing are concerned, the framers drew a bright line
and said to the government ‘Thus far shalt thou come, but no far-
ther.’”250 The Traylor court clearly determined where that bright line
was in regard to Florida’s constitutional right against self-
incrimination: if a suspect makes any invocation of his rights the in-
terrogation must cease.251
However, in Owen II, the court retreated from its previously an-
nounced bright line.252 In doing so, the court failed to give content to
its own command in Traylor—that the state constitution is to be in-
terpreted to give the fullest protections to individual freedoms.253 In-
stead, the court accepted the federal standard, even though the Su-
preme Court’s primary concern was effective law enforcement, not
the protection of individual rights.254
The Davis rule adopted by the Florida Supreme Court guarantees
that the constitutional rights of at least some citizens who unartfully
demand them will be violated.255 The Davis Court defended as toler-
able the certainty that some poorly expressed requests for counsel
will be disregarded.256 Based on Traylor, this is not acceptable under
Florida’s Constitution. State courts must construe each provision of
Florida’s Bill of Rights freely in order to achieve the primary goal of
individual freedom and autonomy.257
3.   The Effect of the Decision on Primacy
The two criticisms of the primacy method of state constitutional
interpretation are that it is result-oriented and that it fosters uncer-
tainty.258 In Owen II the court merely adhered to federal precedent
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without looking to its own constitution.259 The court found no need to
apply a primacy analysis because a decision by the United States
Supreme Court provided authority for an outcome it apparently de-
sired to reach.260 After Owen II it remains uncertain whether the
court will apply a primacy approach when interpreting future consti-
tutional issues. Based on an independent interpretation of Florida’s
Constitution, all district courts in the state adhered to the Florida
Supreme Court’s initial decision in Owen I.261 However, because the
court reversed its earlier decision based entirely on federal law with-
out looking to its own constitution, there is now a climate of uncer-
tainty as to which analysis state courts should use.
The sporadic application of primacy presents practical problems
both for practitioners litigating constitutional issues and for lower
courts resolving those questions. Does a practitioner present solely a
primacy argument? Or does he or she present a lock-step analysis
assuming the reviewing court will parrot the federal decision? Or
should there be some combination of the two?
The confusion mounts for a lower court. What type of review is
appropriate? Traylor commanded the courts to undertake a primacy
analysis. Owen II did not overrule this command, it merely ignored
it. A lower court must hope the end result comports with the desires
of the supreme court if a primacy analysis is ignored. The usage of
an independent analysis, while moribund after the court’s decision
in Owen II, is not yet dead because the court did not reverse Tray-
lor’s primacy approach.262 In fact, the court reminded itself that un-
der Traylor it could reaffirm Owen I despite contrary federal law.263
Only time will tell the role primacy will play in molding an inde-
pendent body of constitutional law in Florida.
E.   The Fate of Primacy in Florida
With the thirtieth anniversary of the 1968 Florida Constitution
approaching, the fate of primacy analysis is indeterminate. However,
as one commentator noted, the status of Florida constitutional law
may be threatened through the constitutional revision process.264
Therefore, the future of primacy may not lie with the Florida Su-
preme Court, but with the citizens of the state.265 The permanency
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and primacy of the Florida Constitution will always be in jeopardy
because the constitution lends itself too easily to amendment.266
The purpose of a state bill of rights is defeated when a state con-
stitution is forced into a lock-step analysis with Supreme Court in-
terpretation of the federal Constitution. Applying federalist princi-
ples, the Florida Constitution should be the primary protector of in-
dividual rights, but if state courts must follow the United States Su-
preme Court lock-step, the Florida Constitution cannot offer its citi-
zens additional protection. This is the reason many commentators
have urged the 1998 Florida Constitution Revision Commission to
take action to make Florida’s constitutional amendment procedures
more stringent.267
VII.   CONCLUSION
The state constitutional law revolution has realigned the his-
torical notions of federalism. States have renewed their role as pro-
tectors of individual rights and liberties. Initially, it appeared that
the Florida Supreme Court was ready to join this revolution, but the
Owen II decision indicates this may not be the case. It appears the
expansive primacy analysis laid down in Traylor was merely the
means to a desired end and the independence of Florida’s Constitu-
tion simply an illusion.
This Article began with a quote by Justice Brennan; therefore, it
seems appropriate to conclude with another.
Federal courts remain an indispensable safeguard of individual
rights against governmental abuse. The revitalization of state con-
stitutional law is no excuse for the weakening of federal protec-
tions and prohibitions. Slashing away at federal rights and reme-
dies undermines our federal system. The strength of our system is
that “it provides a double source of protection for the rights of our
citizens. Federalism is not served when the federal half of that
protection is crippled.”268
Hopefully, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Owen II has not
crippled the Florida Constitution as the champion of individual
rights and liberties.
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